HB8TSEA1 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 16 Cr. 467 ALC 4 V. 5 NORMAN SEABROOK AND MURRAY HUBERFELD, 6 Defendants. 7 -----x 8 9 10 November 8, 2017 9:00 a.m. 11 12 13 Before: 14 HON. ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., District Judge 15 and a jury 16 17 18 **APPEARANCES** 19 JOON H. KIM, United States Attorney for the 20 Southern District of New York KAN MIN NAWADAY, 21 MARTIN S. BELL, RUSSELL CAPONE, 22 Assistant United States Attorneys 23 24 25

HB8TSEA1 1 2 APPEARANCES (Continued) 3 4 BRACEWELL, LLP, Attorneys for defendant Seabrook 5 BY: PAUL LEWIS SHECHTMAN, Esq. MARGARET EMMA LYNAUGH, Esq. 6 Of counsel 7 8 MAZUREK LIPTON, LLP Attorneys for defendant Huberfeld 9 BY: HENRY EDWARD MAZUREK, Esq. EVAN LOREN LIPTON, Esq. 10 Of counsel 11 12 Also Present: BARD HUBBARD, Special Agent FBI 13 YOLANDA BUSTILLO, Paralegal USAO AUGUSTA GRANQUIST, Paralegal 14 15 16 17 (In open court, jury not present) 18 THE COURT: Everyone here? Are all the parties here? 19 MR. MAZUREK: Mr. Huberfeld I think is stuck in an 20 accident. He's not in an accident, but he's been delayed because of an accident in front of the West Side Highway. 21 22 THE COURT: Do you have an estimated time as to when 23 he might arrive? 24 MR. MAZUREK: He said he's at Canal Street right now.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. So counsel, let's discuss

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some general housekeeping matters.

Counsel for Mr. Huberfeld, do you waive his appearance for this?

MR. MAZUREK: I do.

THE COURT: We'll charge the jury this morning. First of all, is there anything that counsel wishes to raise?

MR. BELL: No, your Honor.

MR. MAZUREK: No, your Honor.

MR. SCHECHTMAN: Nothing.

THE COURT: So there are a few typos and little things like that in the jury instructions that we have, we didn't receive anything else from counsel, but I will make these edits on the fly. There may be other edits that need to be made while making them on the fly, so we'll wait until we made all the edits before we actually print out the final copy for the jurors. Let me let counsel know of the things that we have seen so far that we need this change, and they're pretty minor.

On page 10 of the instructions, the second paragraph, reasonable doubt instruction, the fourth sentence in the second paragraph, it is doubt that a reasonable person has. I think that should be — the article "a" should be included there because the next sentence also says it is a doubt, and should be a reasonable doubt, so a doubt.

Any objection, counsel for either side?

MR. MAZUREK: No.

1 MR. NAWADAY: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Then on page 11, the first full paragraph, the second -- I guess the third sentence says commit honest services fraud against the Corrections Officers Benevolent Association, there's an extra S on "Correction," I'll take that off. Counsel have any objection to that?

MR. BELL: No, your Honor.

MR. MAZUREK: No.

MS. LYNAUGH: None.

THE COURT: Then other really, really minor things.

On page 12 we need to conform the dashes, there's a single dash then a double dash on the bottom of page 12, the last paragraph, we'll make that small correction.

Something elsewhere there's a pronoun missing, page 15, the penultimate paragraph, the last full paragraph the one that starts, "The commission of a kickback," the last sentence says "Laws criminalizing kickback payments are designed to prevent quid pro quo corruption where the union official has a duty of loyalty to his membership exchanges his," it seems to me there should be a "who" after "official," so where the union official who had a duty of loyalty to his membership exchanges his official action for something of value, unless counsel has another suggestion.

Counsel, any thoughts on that?

MR. BELL: That seems right, your Honor.

1 MR. MAZUREK: That's fine.

MS. LYNAUGH: We agree.

THE COURT: I didn't see anything else yet. Perhaps while we're waiting it helps for counsel to go ahead and go through, read through the rest of the instructions sort of with a fine tooth comb and see if there's any other typos or things like that so we could fix those and make those adjustments.

Anything else we need to discuss right now while we're waiting for the jurors, counsel for Mr. Huberfeld?

 $\mbox{MR. MAZUREK:}$  Your Honor, we saw in the draft verdict form and it looks fine to us.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel for Mr. Seabrook?

MS. LYNAUGH: Same here.

THE COURT: Counsel for the government?

MR. BELL: Same as well.

THE COURT: We printed out a copy, since there are several drafts, make sure that's the copy that's good with everyone, that's right form of verdict form, and we will mark that as Court Exhibit 2. Court Exhibit 1 will be the jury instructions once we have those finalized, but let's have counsel inspect that and make sure we're all good with that.

The other thing is when I read the jury instructions, that's not going to be particularly riveting for the jury.

It's usually not particularly enjoyable listening to anyone read unless it's Judi Dench or Morgan Freeman and I am neither

of those people, but counsel should be aware, to try to keep the jurors perhaps from snoring during the reading I will attempt to change the speed at which I speak and I may change the pitch of my voice. So, counsel, don't be alarmed, nothing has happened to me.

MR. MAZUREK: Judge, I want to inform the Court that Mr. Lipton is at another court appearance. If he arrives during the reading of the instructions do you want him to wait outside until you're finishing or could he come in?

THE COURT: He could come in as long as he doesn't make a grand entrance, that's fine.

MR. MAZUREK: I'll let him know that.

THE COURT: And again, the plan is what I will do is read the instructions to the jury, then perhaps we'll send the jury into the jury room and they'll probably need a break, and I'll confer with counsel to see if there's anything that I misread or omitted, if so, bring the jury back and correct that.

If not, it will be my intention to perhaps ask my deputy then to bring the alternate jurors out ask them to bring their belongings with them and then tell them that they are free to leave the courtroom but they're not excused, and I will still give them the same instructions that all the other jurors have had and tell them that we may need to reach them.

Any objection to that?

1 MR. SCHECHTMAN: No, Judge.

MR. NAWADAY: No.

THE COURT: I guess before we do that we'll have to have the marshal sworn, but we do that, bring the alternates out, let them go from the jury and the jurors will start deliberating.

My plan is to give counsel an opportunity to get some lunch if you want to that. So we're going to see if we could get lunch delivered to the jury at like 12:30, 12:45, only because the jury may decide to stop at 2:30 with the understanding if the jury has any notes during that 12:30 to 1:30 period of time they will have to wait until we get back.

Counsel fine with that? I didn't want to do a 1:00 to 2:00 because if the jury wants to leave as 2:30 and they have a bunch of notes that come over the lunch break, I don't want to delay.

Any objection to that?

MR. BELL: No, your Honor.

MR. MAZUREK: No.

MS. LYNAUGH: None.

THE COURT: Okay. See you soon. Counsel go through the rest of the instructions and see if there's anything else that needs to be corrected.

(Recess taken)

THE COURT: The jury is all here. My deputy will

bring the jury in.

And counsel, so you know, I don't plan to read the captions, I will just read the instructions. I'll read the captions when I get to the elements of the offense.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Good morning, welcome back. I will now give you the instructions on the law. Now you don't need it take notes for this because -- again, you don't need to take notes for this because we're going to give a copy of these jury instructions to you when you go to deliberate. But it's important that you listen.

It is my duty at this point to instruct you on the law. It is your duty to accept these instructions and apply them to the facts as you determine them. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law may be or should be, it would violate your duty to base a verdict on any other view of the law than the one I give you. If an attorney has stated a legal principle differently than I state it to you, it is my instructions that you must follow.

You should not single out any instruction but should consider my instructions as a whole when you retire to deliberate the verdict. You may take a copy of these instructions with you into the jury room.

Your role is to decide the facts of the case. You are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. You must determine

the facts based solely on the evidence received in this trial. In determining the facts, you must rely upon your own recollection of the evidence. What the lawyers have said, for instance, in opening statements, in closing arguments, in objections or in questions, is not evidence. You should bear in mind particularly that a question put to a witness is not evidence, it is only the answer that is evidence.

The lawyers' arguments are intended to convince you to draw certain conclusions from the evidence or lack of evidence. Those arguments important. You should weigh and evaluate them carefully. But you must not confuse them with the evidence. As to what the evidence was, it is your recollection that governs, not the statements of the lawyers.

You should draw no inference or conclusion for or against any party by reason of the lawyers making objections or my ruling on those objections. The attorneys have a duty to make legal objections when they think that such objections are appropriate. You should not be swayed against the government or the defendants simply because counsel for either side has chosen to make an objection. Similarly, statements made by counsel when arguing the admissibility of evidence are not to be considered as evidence.

I remind you also that nothing that I have said during the trial or during these instructions is evidence. Similarly, the rulings I have made during the trial are not any indication

of my views of what your decision should be. My rulings were based solely on issues of law. Do not concern yourselves with what was said at sidebar conferences or during my discussions with counsel. Those discussions related to rulings of law and not to matters of fact.

The law recognizes two types of evidence, direct and circumstantial. You may rely on either type of evidence.

Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, directly shows a fact. For instance, one kind of direct evidence is a witness's testimony about something she knows by virtue of her own senses, something the witness has seen, felt, touched or heard.

Direct evidence may also be in the form of an exhibit.

Circumstantial evidence is a chain of circumstances that indirectly proves a fact. Stated differently, circumstantial evidence is a fact or series of facts that, if believed, leads to a conclusion that another fact exists. For example, if a witness testified that she saw it raining outside and you believed her, that would be direct evidence it was raining. If someone walked into the courtroom wearing a raincoat covered with drops of water and carrying a wet umbrella, that would be circumstantial evidence from which you could conclude it was raining.

Circumstantial evidence is as valuable as direct evidence. The law makes no distinction between them. There are times when different inferences may be drawn from the

facts, whether they are proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. The government asks you to draw one set of inferences. The defendants ask you to draw another. It is for you, and you alone, to decide what inferences you will draw.

Much of the evidence you heard was presented to you in the form of testimony from witnesses. First, let me remind you that it is for you and you alone to decide the credibility of witnesses who appeared here and the weight their evidence deserves. Your determination of the credibility of a witness largely depends upon the impression the witness made upon you as to whether or not he or she was giving an accurate version of what occurred.

The degree of credit given to a witness should be determined by his or her demeanor, relationship to the controversy and the parties, bias or impartiality, the reasonableness of the witness's statement, the strength or weakness of the witness's recollection viewed in light of all other testimony, and the attendant circumstances in the case. In passing upon the credibility of a witness, you may also take into account any inconsistencies or contradictions as to material matters in his or her testimony.

You may consider whether a witness had or did not have a motive to lie. If a witness had a motive to lie, you may consider whether and to what extent, if any, that motive affected the truthfulness of that witness's testimony. If a

witness did not have a motive to lie, you may consider that as well in evaluating the witness's truthfulness.

You have heard evidence during the trial that the witnesses have discussed the facts of the case and their testimony with the lawyers before the witnesses appeared in court. There is nothing unusual or improper about a witness meeting with lawyers before testifying so that the witness could be aware of the subjects she will be questioned about. The weight you give to the fact or the nature of the witness's preparation for her testimony and what inferences you draw from such preparation are matters completely within your discretion.

If you find that any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material fact, you have the right to reject the testimony of that witness in its entirety. On the other hand, even if you find that a witness has testified falsely about one matter, you may reject as false that portion of his or her testimony and accept as true any other portion of his or her testimony. A witness may be inaccurate, contradictory, or even untruthful in some aspects, and yet be truthful and entirely credible in other aspects of his or her testimony.

The ultimate question for you to decide in passing upon credibility is: Did the witness tell the truth before you? It is for you to say whether his or her testimony at trial is true in whole or in part in light of the witness's demeanor, explanations, and all of the evidence in the case.

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In evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, you should take into account any evidence that the witness who testified may benefit in some way from the outcome of this case. Such an interest in the outcome creates a motive to testify falsely and may sway the witness to testify in a way that advances his or her own interest. Therefore, if you find that any witnesses whose testimony you are considering may have an interest in the outcome of this trial, then you should bear that factor in mind when evaluating his or her credibility and accept it with great care.

This is not to suggest that every witness who has an interest in the outcome of a case will testify falsely. It is for you to decide to what extent, if at all, the witness's interest has affected or colored his or her testimony.

You have heard evidence that at some earlier time witnesses have said or done something that counsel argues is inconsistent with their trial testimony. Evidence of a prior inconsistent statement was placed before you only for the purpose of helping you decide whether to believe the testimony of a witness who may have contradicted a prior statement he or she made. If you find that the witness made an earlier statement that conflicts with the witness's testimony, you may consider that fact when deciding how much of the witness's testimony, if any, to believe.

In making this determination, you may consider whether

the witness purposely made a false statement or whether it was an innocent mistake; whether the inconsistency concerns an important fact or whether it had to do with a small detail; whether the witness had an explanation for the inconsistency, and whether that explanation appealed to your common sense.

It is exclusively your duty, based upon all the evidence and your own good judgment, to determine whether the prior statement was inconsistent, and if so, how much, if any, weight to give to the inconsistent statement in determining whether to believe all, or part, of the witness's testimony.

Some of you took notes periodically throughout this trial. I want to emphasize to you that notes are simply an aid to your memory. Notes that you may have made should not be given greater weight or influence than the recollections or impressions of other jurors with respect to the evidence presented or what conclusions, if any, should be drawn from the such evidence. All jurors' recollections are equal.

Some of the exhibits received in evidence at this trial were in the form of charts. Some of these charts were introduced as summaries. Summary charts are not themself direct evidence. They are instead summaries or analyses of evidence that was received, either in the form of documents or testimony. The charts are intended to assist you in your deliberations. However, it is the underlying evidence and the weight that you attribute to it that gives value and

significance to these charts. To the extent that the charts conform to what you determine the underlying evidence to be, you should accept them. To the extent that the charts differ from what you determine the underlying evidence to be, you may reject them.

The fact that the prosecution is brought in the name of the United States of America entitles the government to no greater consideration than that given to any other party. By the same token, the government is entitled to no less consideration.

The indictment is not evidence. It is an accusation, a statement of what the government intends to prove by offering evidence at trial. It gives the defendants notice of the charges against them and states the nature of the accusations.

Because the indictment is not evidence and does not prove guilt, you are to give it no weight. Nor are you to attempt to consider how the indictment was obtained. A defendant begins trial with a clean slate and without any evidence against him or her. What matters is the evidence that you heard and saw during the trial.

The defendants are formally charged in an indictment.

The indictment consists of charges or accusations. It is not evidence. I will not read the entire indictment to you at this time. Rather, I will first summarize the offenses charged in the indictment. Then I will explain in detail the elements of

the offenses.

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Before I do so, however, I need to define the term reasonable doubt, for the government must prove each element of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Since, in order to convict the defendant of a given charge, the government is required to prove that charge beyond a reasonable doubt, the What is a reasonable doubt? The words question then is: almost define themselves. It is a doubt based upon reason. Ιt is a doubt that a reasonable person has after carefully weighing all of the evidence. It is a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in a matter of importance in his or her personal life. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely upon in making an important decision.

A reasonable doubt is not caprice or whim. It is not speculation or suspicion. It is not an excuse to avoid the performance of an unpleasant duty. The law does not require that the government prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; proof beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict.

If, after fair and impartial consideration of the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt with respect to a particular charge against him, you must find the defendant not guilty on that charge.

On the other hand, if, after fair and impartial

consideration of all of the evidence, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt with respect to a particular charge against him, you should find the defendant guilty of that charge.

Having defined reasonable doubt, let me discuss the charges. The indictment contains two charges or counts.

Count One charges Norman Seabrook and Murray Huberfeld with participating in a conspiracy to commit honest services fraud against the Correction Officers Benevolent Association, or COBA, in connection with Seabrook's position as the president of COBA. In particular, Count One charges that Huberfeld agreed to pay kickbacks to Seabrook in exchange for Seabrook directing millions of dollars of COBA funds to a Manhattan hedge fund.

Under our criminal laws, conspiring or agreeing to commit a crime, as charged in Count One, is a separate crime from committing the crime, which is charged in Count Two.

Count Two charges that the Seabrook committed honest services fraud against COBA and Huberfeld aided and abetted the same. In particular, Count Two alleges that Huberfeld arranged the payment of a kickback to Seabrook in exchange for Seabrook directing millions of dollars of COBA funds to a Manhattan hedge fund.

Now there are two defendants on trial before you. Each has been charged with the same crimes. You must return a

separate verdict of guilty or not guilty for each defendant. In reaching your verdict, bear in mind that guilt is personal and is individual. Your verdict must be based solely upon the evidence about each defendant. The case against each defendant stands or falls upon the proof or lack of proof against that defendant alone, and your verdict as to any defendant should not influence your decision as to any other defendant.

Count Two, honest services wire fraud.

As I have stated, defendants Norman Seabrook and Murray Huberfeld are charged with two counts in the indictment. Count One charges a conspiracy to violate the honest services wire fraud statute, and Count Two charges a violation of the honest services wire fraud statute.

To make my instructions more easily understood, I will start with Count Two first and then discuss Count One. As to Count Two, I will instruct you first as to Norman Seabrook and then as to Murray Huberfeld.

In order to sustain its burden of proof against

Mr. Seabrook with respect to Count Two, the honest services

wire fraud count, the government must prove four elements

beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, that there was a scheme or artifice to defraud the New York City Correction Officers Benevolent Association and its members' intangible right to Norman Seabrook's honest services through bribery or kickbacks.

Second, that Norman Seabrook knowingly and willfully participated in the scheme or artifice, with knowledge of its fraudulent nature and with specific intent to defraud.

Third, that the scheme or artifice to defraud involved a material misrepresentation or omission.

Fourth, that in the execution of that scheme,

Mr. Seabrook used or caused the use by another of interstate or

foreign wires, as alleged in the indictment.

First element, existence of scheme or artifice to defraud.

The first element of honest services wire fraud that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that there was a scheme or artifice to defraud COBA of its intangible right to the honest services of Norman Seabrook through a kickback. A union official owes a fiduciary duty, that is, a duty of honest and faithful services, to his union and its members. When a union official obtains an undisclosed kickback in exchange for actions taken in his capacity as a union official on behalf of the person or entity paying the bribe or kickback, he has breached his duty of honest and faithful service.

A "scheme or artifice" is a plan for the accomplishment of an object.

"Fraud" is a general term that embraces all the various means that human ingenuity can devise and that are

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resorted to by an individual to gain an advantage over another by false representations, suggestions or supression of the truth, or deliberate disregard for the truth.

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Thus, a "scheme to defraud" in this context is merely a plan to deprive COBA of its right to Norman Seabrook's honest services through the payment of an undisclosed kickback to Mr. Seabrook in exchange for his steering the union's funds.

A scheme to defraud need not be shown by direct evidence, but may be established by all of the circumstances and facts in the case.

A statement, representation, or document is false if it is untrue when made and was then known to be untrue by the person making it or causing it to be made. A statement, representation, or document is fraudulent if it was made falsely and with intent to deceive. A representation, statement, claim, or document may also be fraudulent if it contains half truths or if it conceals material facts in a manner which makes what is said or represented deliberately misleading or deceptive.

The deception need not be premised on spoken or written words alone. The arrangement of the words or the circumstances in which they are used may convey the false and deceptive appearance. In the context honest services fraud, the deceit may consist of the concealment of kickbacks that the union official has solicited or received, or the union

official's implicit false pretense to his union that he has not solicited or obtained kickbacks in exchange for taking actions on behalf of the person or entity providing the bribes or kickbacks. If there is deception, the manner in which it is accomplished is immaterial.

It does not matter whether any of the individuals or entities involved might have discovered the fraud had they probed it further. If you find that a scheme or artifice existed, it is irrelevant whether you believe that any individual or entity involved was careless, gullible, or even negligent. Furthermore, it is not necessary that the government prove that the intended victim actually suffered any loss. It is sufficient for the government to prove that COBA did not receive the honest and faithful services of Seabrook.

To prove that Mr. Seabrook has committed the particular scheme to defraud here beyond a reasonable doubt, the government must show that he was involved in a kickback scheme. A kickback scheme involves a union official's steering business of his union to a third party in exchange for something of value in violation of his fiduciary duty to the union. That is, the government must show that Mr. Seabrook received a kickback in a quid pro quo. Quid pro quo is Latin, and it means "this for that" or "these for those." A kickback is anything of value which is provided to a union official in exchange for the promise or performance of official action.

The term "official action" includes any decision or action on any question or matter which may at any time be pending before the union, or pursuant to the union bylaws may be brought before the union. A union official can perform an official action by exercising influence over a union decision when it is a settled practice as part of the official's position for him to do so. In addition, official action includes the exercise of both formal official influence, such as a union official's votes, and informal official influence, such as exerting pressure on other union officials. However, setting up a meeting or engaging in a discussion with another union official, without more, is not an official action.

As I have previously noted, a union official receives a bribe or a kickback when he demands, seeks, or receives something of value, directly or indirectly, from another person in exchange for taking official action on behalf of the person or entity paying the kickback. While outwardly appearing to be exercising independent judgment in his actions on behalf of the union, the union official instead has been paid privately for his actions. Thus, the union or employer is not receiving the union official's honest and faithful service to which it is entitled.

The union official need not have initiated the payments, but he must have known that the payment was made in exchange for influencing his actions based on his position.

The improper benefit may consist of money and other financial benefits, whether given on a one-time basis or as a stream of payments to the defendant. You have heard testimony that Jona Rechnitz gave Norman Seabrook gifts. Standing alone, the fact that Mr. Seabrook may have received trips, shoes, cigars, or other such gifts from Mr. Rechnitz does not make Mr. Seabrook or Mr. Huberfeld guilty of either of the charges in this case.

It is not a defense for a defendant to claim that he would have lawfully performed the actions in question even without having accepted a thing of value. In other words, it is not a defense that the offer or promise of anything of value was made to a union official in exchange for actions that were lawful, desirable, or even beneficial to his union. The offense of honest services fraud is not concerned with the wisdom or results of the union official's decisions, but rather with the manner in which the official makes his or her decisions.

The commission of a kickback requires that the government prove that the thing of value was given and received with the deliberate purpose of influencing an official act of the person it was given to. A kickback may not be founded on a mere attempt to curry favor or build good will. Laws criminalizing kickback payments are designed to prevent quid pro quo corruption where the union official who has a duty of

loyalty to his membership exchanges his official action for something of value.

If you find that Mr. Seabrook understood that the thing of value being provided was solely to cultivate good will or to curry favor with the person or entity who provided the thing of value and not in exchange for the promise or performance of any official action, then this element will not have been proven. On the other hand, if you find that the government has proven that Mr. Seabrook accepted the kickback or thing of value, at least in part, to take official action in return four the kickback, then this element will have been proven.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Mr. Seabrook has violated the duty to provide honest services

by soliciting or receiving kickback payments, as defined here,

alone or with the help of others, then you may find this

element satisfied.

Second element, participation in a scheme with intent to defraud.

The second element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that Mr. Seabrook knowingly and willfully participated in a scheme to defraud with knowledge of its fraudulent nature and with specific intent to defraud.

"Knowingly" means to act voluntarily and deliberately rather than mistakenly or inadvertently.

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"Willfully" means to act knowingly and purposely, with an intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.

To "participate" in a scheme to defraud means to associate oneself with it with a view and an intent toward making it succeed.

"Intend to defraud" means to act knowingly with a specific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing some financial or property loss to another or depriving another of the intangible right of honest services.

The question of whether a person acted knowingly, willfully, and with intent to defraud is a question of fact for you to determine like any other fact question. This question involves one's state of mind. Direct proof of knowledge and fraudulent intent is almost never available. It would be a rare case where it could be shown that a person wrote or stated that as of a given time in the past he committed an act with fraudulent intent. Such direct proof is not required.

In our everyday affairs we are continuously called upon to decide from the actions of others what they intended and what their state of mind is. Experience has taught us that frequently actions speak louder and more clearly than spoken or written words. The ultimate facts of knowledge and criminal intent, though subjective, may be established by circumstantial evidence based upon a person's outward manifestations, words,

conduct, acts, and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed by the evidence and the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Circumstantial evidence, if believed, is of no less value than direct evidence.

Because an essential element of the crime charged is intent to defraud, it follows that good faith on the part of a defendant is a complete defense to a charge of honest services wire fraud. However, a defendant has no burden to establish a defense of good faith. The burden is on the government to prove fraudulent intent and the consequent lack of good faith beyond a reasonable doubt. In this regard, it is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant was motivated solely by improper considerations. A defendant may be found to have an intent to defraud even if he also has other intents. The government will have satisfied its burden of proof on this element if you find that the defendant has an intent to defraud, even if he also had other proper or neutral intents for his actions.

Proof of motive is not a necessary element of the crimes with which the defendants are charged. Proof of motive does not establish guilt, nor does the lack of proof of motive establish that a defendant is not guilty. The presence or absence a motive is, however, a circumstance which you may consider as bearing on a defendant's intent.

To conclude on this element, in order to sustain the

charge against Mr. Seabrook, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was a knowing participant in the scheme and acted with specific intent to defraud.

Third element, materiality.

The third element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the false pretenses, representations, promises or omissions described in relation to the first element were material in that they had the natural tendency to influence or were capable of influencing the COBA board to change its behavior. Put another way, a material fact is one which would reasonably be expected to be of concern to a reasonable and prudent person in relying upon the representation or statement in making a decision.

This means that if you find a particular statement of fact to have been false, you must determine whether that statement was one that a reasonable person might have considered important in making his or her decision. The same principle applies to fraudulent half-truths or omissions of material facts.

Fourth element, use of wires.

The fourth and final element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the use of an interstate or international wire communication in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. The term "wire facilities" includes telephones,

faxes, emails and wire transfers between banks. The wire communication must pass between two or more states as, for example, a telephone call between New York and any other state.

It is not necessary for a defendant to be directly or personally involved in the wire communication as long as the communication was reasonably foreseeable in the execution of the alleged scheme to defraud in which the defendant is accused of participating.

In this regard, it would be sufficient to establish this element of the crime if the evidence justifies a finding that the defendant caused the wires to be used by others; and this does not mean that a defendant himself must have specifically authorized others to use a wire facility. When one does an act with knowledge that the use of the wire will follow in the ordinary course of business or where such use of the wires can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he causes the wires to be used. Incidentally, this wire use requirement is satisfied even if the wire use was done by a person with no knowledge of the fraudulent scheme, including a victim of the alleged fraud.

The use of the wire need not itself be fraudulent.

Stated another way, the material wired need not contain any fraudulent representation or even any request for money. It is sufficient if the wires were used to further or assist in carrying out the scheme to defraud.

Finally, if you find that the wire communication was reasonably foreseeable and that the interstate wire use charged in the indictment took place, then this element is satisfied even if it was not foreseeable that the wire communication would cross state or national lines. However, if you find that wire communications were used in furtherance of the scheme to defraud, you must be unanimous as to at least one of the particular interstate or foreign wire communications in furtherance of the scheme that occurred.

Aiding and abetting liability.

Aiding and abetting liability is its own theory of criminal liability. Under the aiding and abetting statute, it is not necessary for the government to show that a defendant himself physically committed the crime with which he is charged in order for the government to sustain its burden of proof. A person who aids and abets another to commit an offense is just as guilty of that offense as if he committed it himself.

Accordingly, you may find Murray Huberfeld guilty of honest services wire fraud if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government has proven that Mr. Seabrook actually committed the crime of honest services wire fraud and that Mr. Huberfeld aided and abetted in the commission of that crime.

The first requirement is that you find that another person has committed the crime at issue: Honest services wire

fraud as charged in Count Two. If you find that Mr. Seabrook did not commit honest services wire fraud, then you need not deliberate further on Count Two as to Mr. Huberfeld. If Mr. Seabrook is not guilty of that crime, then Mr. Huberfeld cannot be guilty of aiding and abetting him to commit it.

To aid and abet another to commit a crime, a defendant must have willfully and knowingly associated himself in some way with the crime, and he must have participated in the crime by doing some act to help make the crime succeed.

Participation in a crime is willful if done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something which the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with a bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.

The mere presence of Mr. Huberfeld where a crime is being committed, even coupled with knowledge by the defendant that a crime is being committed, is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. One who has no knowledge that a crime is being committed or is about to be committed, but inadvertently does something that aids in the commission of that crime, is not an aider and abettor. An aider and abettor must know that the crime is being committed and act in a way which is intended it to bring out the success of the criminal venture.

To determine if Mr. Huberfeld aided and abetted the commission of honest services wire fraud, ask yourself these

1 questions:

Did Mr. Seabrook commit the crime at issue, the crime of honest services wire fraud?

If so, did Mr. Huberfeld participate in that crime charged as something that he wished to bring about?

Did Mr. Huberfeld knowingly and willfully associate himself with the honest services wire fraud?

Did he seek by his actions to make the criminal venture succeed?

If so, then he is an aider and abettor, and therefore he is guilty of the offense under consideration. If, on the other hand, your answer to any one of these questions is no, then he is not an aider and abettor and you must find him not guilty.

Count One, conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud.

In addition to the substantive count of honest services wire fraud in Count Two, defendants Seabrook and Huberfeld are charged in Count One of the indictment with participating in a conspiracy to violate the honest services wire fraud statute, the crime I have just described.

A conspiracy is a kind of criminal partnership, an agreement of two or more persons to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose. In order to satisfy its burden of proof with respect to the allegation of conspiracy, the government

must establish each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, the existence of the conspiracy charged in the indictment.

Second, that at some point the defendant you are considering knowingly and willfully became a member of and joined in the conspiracy.

Element one, conspiracy, existence of an agreement.

The first element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the existence of the conspiracy; that is, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more persons came to an agreement or understanding that would try to accomplish an unlawful purpose as charged in Count One.

The offense of conspiracy to commit an illegal act is separate and distinct from the actual commission of the illegal act that is the object of the conspiracy. To put it in context, conspiracy to commit the illegal act of honest services wire fraud is a separate and distinct crime from committing honest services wire fraud.

The defendant you are considering need not have committed the illegal act or acts that is the object of the conspiracy in order to be found guilt of the separate and independent crime of conspiracy. Putting it in practical terms, even if you acquit the defendant of Count Two, which is

is honest services wire fraud, you must still consider whether that defendant conspired to commit that crime because it is a separate, independent crime.

In order for the government to satisfy this element, you need not find that the alleged members of the conspiracy met together and entered into any express or formal agreement.

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Similarly, you need not find that the alleged conspirator stated in words or writing what the scheme was, its object or purpose, or every precise detail of the scheme or the means by which its object or purpose was to be accomplished.

Indeed, it would be extraordinary if there were such a formal document or specific oral agreement. When people agree to enter into a criminal conspiracy, much is left to unexpressed understanding. What the government must prove is that there was a mutual understanding, either spoken or unspoken, between two or more people to cooperate with each other to accomplish an unlawful act.

You may, of course, find that the existence of an agreement to disobey or disregard the law has been established by direct proof. However, since conspiracy is, by its very nature, characterized by secrecy, you may also infer its existence from the circumstances of this case and the conduct of the parties involved.

It is not required that any particular number of people join together in order for the government to prove that a conspiracy existed. You need only find that two or more people entered into the unlawful agreement alleged in the indictment in order for you to find that a conspiracy existed.

In a very real sense, then, in the context of conspiracy cases, actions often speak louder than words. In this regard, you may, in determining whether an agreement

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existed here, consider the actions and statements of all of those you find to be participants as proof that a common design existed on the part of the persons charged to act together to accomplish an unlawful purpose.

Often the only evidence available is that of disconnected acts that, when taken together in connection with each other, show a conspiracy or agreement to secure a particular result as satisfactorily and conclusively as more direct proof.

Of course, proof concerning the accomplishment of the objects of the conspiracy may be the most persuasive evidence of the existence of the conspiracy itself, but it is not necessary that the conspiracy actually succeed in its purpose in order for you to conclude that the conspiracy existed.

In determining whether the conspiracy charged in Count 1 actually existed, you may consider all the evidence of the acts, conduct and statements of the alleged conspirators and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from such evidence.

In regard to the timing of the alleged wire fraud conspiracy, Count 1 alleges that the conspiracy existed from about November 2013 through about 2015. It is not necessary that the government prove that the conspiracy started or ended on a particular precise date as long as it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy was formed and existed at some point during the period alleged in the indictment which

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covers from November 2013 until 2015.

Finally, a conspiracy requires an object, some illegal thing that the members of the conspiracy agree they will try to accomplish. The conspiracy alleged in Count 1 has as its object honest services wire fraud. I have already explained the law regarding honest services wire fraud, so in deciding whether people agreed to violate the law of honest services wire fraud, you should consider my instructions on honest services wire fraud.

2. Conspiracy, members in a conspiracy.

If you conclude that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy charged in Count 1 of the indictment existed, you must next determine the second question, and that is whether the defendant you are considering participated in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purpose and in furtherance of its unlawful object.

The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, by his own actions and conduct, intentionally and knowingly entered into the conspiracy or agreement with a criminal intent; that is, with awareness of the generally unlawful nature of his acts. The defendant need not have known which specific law or rule his acts violated in order to be aware that his acts were unlawful.

As you can see, this element concerns a person's state of mind. Direct proof of state of mind is not always

available. Indeed, it would be a rare case where it could be shown that a person wrote or stated that as of a given time in the past, he committed an act with a certain state of mind. Such direct proof is not required.

For this element, the terms "intentionally" and "knowingly" mean that you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that in joining the conspiracy, if you find the defendant did join the conspiracy, the defendant knew what he was doing, that he took the actions in question deliberately and voluntarily.

An act is done intentionally and knowingly only if it is done deliberately and purposefully; that is, the act must have been the product of the defendant's conscious objective rather than the product of force, mistake, accident, mere negligence or some other innocent reason.

Now, knowledge is a matter of inference from the proven facts. Science has not yet devised a manner of looking into a person's mind and knowing what that person is thinking. However, you have before you the evidence of certain acts, conversations and statements alleged to involve the defendants and others. The ultimate facts of knowledge of criminal intent may be established by words and conduct and all the surrounding circumstances as well as the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn from the words and conduct. It is for you to determine whether the government has established beyond a

reasonable doubt such knowledge and intent on the part of the defendant you are considering.

known the full extent of the conspiracy charged in Count 1 or all of its activities or all of its participants. It is not even necessary that the defendant know every other member of the conspiracy. In fact, the defendant may know only one other member of the conspiracy and still be a co-conspirator. Nor is it necessary that a defendant receive any monetary benefit for participating in the conspiracy or have a financial stake in the outcome so long as he, in fact, participated in the conspiracy in the manner explained with knowledge of its object or objects and with the intent to further that object or objects.

The duration and extent of a defendant's participation in the conspiracy has no bearing on the issue of a defendant's guilt. The defendant need not have joined the conspiracy at the outset. The defendant may have joined it for any purpose at any time in its progress, and that defendant will still be held responsible for all that was done before he joined and all that was done during the conspiracy's existence while the defendant was a member.

Each member of the conspiracy may perform separate and distinct acts and may perform them at different times. Some conspirators played major roles, while others played minor

roles in the scheme. An equal role is not what the law requires. In fact, even a single act may be sufficient to draw the defendant within the ambit of the conspiracy.

However, I want to caution you that the mere association by one person with another does not make that person a member of the conspiracy even when coupled with knowledge that a conspiracy is taking place. Similarly, mere presence at the scene of the crime, even coupled with knowledge that a crime is taking place, is not sufficient to support a conviction. In other words, knowledge without participation is not sufficient. A person may know or be friendly with a criminal without being a criminal himself.

Mere similarity of conduct or the fact that they may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests does not necessarily establish membership in a conspiracy.

What is necessary is that the defendant participated in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purpose and with an intent to aid in the accomplishment of its unlawful object.

In sum, the defendant, with an understanding of the unlawful character of the conspiracy, must have intentionally and knowingly engaged, advised or assisted in it for the purpose of furthering an illegal undertaking. The defendant thereby became a knowing and willing participant in the unlawful agreement; that is to say, a conspirator.

You will notice that the indictment refers to various

dates. The law requires only a substantial similarity between the time alleged in the indictment and the time established by the evidence.

In addition to evaluating the elements of each offense, you must also consider the issue of venue as to each offense. The government must establish what is called venue, which means that some act in furtherance of that charge occurred in the Southern District of New York. The Southern District of New York includes Manhattan, the Bronx and Westchester, Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, Orange and Sullivan Counties. Venue is proven if any act in furtherance of the crime you are considering occurred in the Southern District of New York regardless of whether it was the act of a charged defendant or anyone else.

Furthermore, on the issue of venue only, the government can meet its burden by a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. That means the government can meet its burden by showing that it was more likely than not that an act in furtherance of a given crime occurred in the Southern District of New York.

There are several people whose names you have heard during the course of the trial who did not appear here to testify. Both the government and the defendants have the same power to subpoena witnesses to testify on their behalf. If a potential witness could have been called by the government or

by a defendant, and no one called the witness, then you may draw the conclusion that the testimony of the absent witness might have been unfavorable to the government or to the defendants, or to both.

On the other hand, you may choose to draw no inference at all from the failure of either side to call a witness. You should remember that there is no duty on either side to call a witness whose testimony would be merely cumulative of testimony already in evidence or who would merely provide additional testimony to facts already in evidence.

You should also remember that the law does not impose on a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

You have heard testimony of law enforcement officers and employees of the government. The fact that a witness is employed by the government does not mean that his or her testimony is necessarily deserving of more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that of any other witness.

It is legitimate for defense counsel to attack the credibility of a government witness like any other witness. It is your decision, after reviewing all of the evidence, whether to accept or reject the testimony of the witness and to give that testimony whatever weight you find it deserves.

You may not draw any inference, favorable or

unfavorable, towards the government or the defendants from the fact that any person other than the defendants is not on trial here. You may not speculate as to the reasons why other persons are not on trial. Those matters are wholly outside your concern and have no bearing on your function as jurors.

You have also heard from a witness who testified that he was involved in criminal conduct and who subsequently pled guilty pursuant to what is called a cooperation agreement with the government. Your concern is whether a witness has given truthful testimony in court. Whether or not you approve of the use of cooperating witnesses to detect and investigate unlawful activities is not to enter into your deliberations in any way. The government sometimes must rely on the testimony of witnesses who have pleaded guilty and are cooperating. Indeed, the testimony of a single accomplice witness may be enough in itself for conviction if you believe the testimony establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

You should scrutinize and view with caution the testimony of any witness who has signed a cooperation agreement. In doing so, you should ask yourself whether the witness would benefit more from lying or by telling the truth. Was his testimony made up in any way because he believed or hoped he would receive favorable treatment by testifying falsely, or did he believe that his interests would be best served by testifying truthfully?

If you believe that the witness was motivated by hopes of personal gain, was the motivation one that would cause him to lie or was it one that would cause him to tell the truth?

Did the motivation color his testimony? In sum, you should look at all of the evidence in deciding what credence and what weight, if any, you will want to give to the cooperating witness.

You have heard testimony from a witness who pled guilty to the charges arising out of the same facts as this case. You are to draw no conclusions or inferences of any kind about the guilt of the defendants on trial here from the fact that a witness pled guilty to similar charges or unrelated charges. The decision of a witness to plead guilty is his own personal decision. It may not be used by you in any way as evidence against or unfavorable to the defendants on trial here.

Norman Seabrook and Murray Huberfeld did not testify in this case. Under our Constitution, a defendant has no obligation to testify or to present any evidence because it is the government's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden remains with the government throughout the entire trial. A defendant is never required to prove that he is innocent. You may not attach any significance to the fact that a defendant did not testify. No adverse inference against him may be drawn by you because he did not take the witness

stand. You may not consider this in any way in your deliberations.

You may consider the investigative techniques used by the government in deciding whether the government has met its burden of proof because you should look to all of the evidence or lack of evidence in deciding whether the defendants are guilty. However, you are also instructed that there is no legal requirement that the government use any specific investigative techniques to prove its case. Whether you approve or disapprove of various law enforcement techniques is not the question. You should determine whether or not, based on the evidence or lack of evidence, the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The government has offered evidence in the form of recorded conversations, text messages and emails. Whether you approve or disapprove of the recording of these conversations may not enter your deliberations. I instruct you that the recordings were made in a lawful manner and that no one's rights were violated and that this evidence was properly admitted at this trial.

You must, therefore, regardless of any personal opinions, consider this evidence as you would any other evidence in this case in making your determination as to its meaning and significance, if any, in evaluating whether the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of

the defendants.

Stipulations have been entered into relating to various facts in this case. A stipulation of fact is an agreement between the parties that a certain fact is true. You must regard such agreed facts as true.

You have also heard evidence in the form of stipulations of testimony. A stipulation of testimony is an agreement among the parties that, if called, a witness would have given certain testimony. You must accept as true the fact that the witness would have given the testimony. However, it is for you to determine the significance of that testimony.

We have among the exhibits received in evidence some documents that are redacted. "Redacted" means that part of the document or tape was taken out. You are to concern yourself only with the part of the item that has been admitted into evidence. You should not consider any possible reason why the other part of it has been deleted.

The defendants have pled not guilty to the charges.

As a result, the burden is on the government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to a defendant and never imposes upon a defendant the burden or duty of testifying, calling any witnesses or locating or producing any evidence. The law presumes the defendants are innocent of each charge. This presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant. This presumption was with each

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defendant when the trial began and remains with each defendant unless and until you are convinced that the government has proven a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

You should not consider the question of possible punishment of a defendant in determining if he is guilty of the crimes charged. Sentencing is exclusively the function of the court. It is not your concern and you should not give any consideration to that issue in deciding what your verdict will be. Therefore, I instruct you not to consider punishment or possible punishment at all in your deliberations in this case.

You are not to be swayed by sympathy or prejudice.

You are to be guided solely by the evidence in this case. It is for you alone to decide whether the government has proven a defendant is guilty of the crimes charged solely on the basis of the evidence and subject to the law as I have given it to you.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt, you should not hesitate to acquit the defendant. On the other hand, if you should find that the government has met its burden of proving a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you should not hesitate because of sympathy or any other reason to render a verdict of guilty.

You're about to go into the jury room and begin your deliberations. If during those deliberations you want any of the exhibits or any specific portions of the testimony, the

exhibits will be furnished to you and the testimony will be provided to you. Please remember that it is not always easy to locate testimony, so be as specific as you possibly can be in any request for testimony. A vague or overbroad request for testimony can lead to delays.

The foreperson will preside over your deliberations and will be your spokesperson in court. This is done simply for convenience. It gives him or her no greater authority and his or her oath has no greater weight than any other jurors. You are free to select any foreperson you like.

Any communication with the court should be made to me in writing, signed by your foreperson, and given to one of the marshals. I will respond to any questions or requests you have as promptly as possible, either in writing or by having you return to the courtroom so I can speak with you in person.

Your function now is to weigh the evidence in this case and to determine if the government has proven the crimes charged. You must base your verdict solely on the evidence or lack of evidence and these instructions as to the law. You are obligated to follow the law as I instruct you whether you agree or disagree with the particular law in question.

The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agrees to it. Your verdict must be unanimous. You should consult with one another and deliberate with a goal of

reaching an agreement. Each of you must decide the case for himself or herself, but do so only after an impartial discussion and consideration of all of the evidence with your fellow jurors. Do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous, but do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors.

Remember you are judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to determine whether the government has proven the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are divided, do not report how the vote stands. When you reach a verdict, do not report what it is until you have been instructed to do so.

In conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, I am sure that if you listen to the views of your fellow jurors and if you apply your own common sense, you will reach a fair verdict here.

Remember that your verdict must be rendered without fear, without favor, without prejudice or sympathy.

I have prepared a verdict form for you to use and for you to report the verdict you reach unanimously on it. I have given you the instructions on the law. What we are going to do now, I will send you to the jury room to take a break. I have to consult with counsel to make sure I haven't omitted anything. Do not start deliberating yet. Do not discuss this case with anyone. Don't discuss it amongst yourselves. Don't

read anything about this case or listen to anything about this case. If you see anything, stop reading. If you hear anything, stop listening. Again don't let anyone discuss this with you. Don't discuss it amongst yourselves. Don't do any research regarding any of the people or issues involved in this case. I will see you in 10 minutes.

(Jury excused)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

So, counsel, I made a few edits on the fly there.

We'll make those edits in the final version we will give to

counsel and give to the jury. Are there any objections to my

reading of the instructions? Did I leave out anything or make

a misstatement?

MR. SHECHTMAN: Judge, Mr. Seabrook used the men's room. We will waive his appearance for this brief discussion.

THE COURT: That is fine.

MR. BELL: I think we are fine, Judge, yes.

THE COURT: Counsel for Mr. Seabrook?

MR. SHECHTMAN: We are fine, Judge. We liked your deeper voice.

THE COURT: Counsel for Mr. Huberfeld?

MR. MAZUREK: We are also fine with the instructions.

THE COURT: We'll make those edits before we send that in to the jurors. What we will do now is I will give counsel a little bit of a break, too. We will bring all the jurors out

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and have the marshal sworn, and then afterwards what we can do then, we'll ask the alternate jurors to go and get their belongings and come back out. Then we can send the other jurors in to start their deliberations. I will handle that process with the alternate jurors and won't dismiss them and let them go home. Any objection to that?

MR. BELL: No, your Honor.

MS. LYNAUGH: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All good with the verdict form? Counsel have seen that and have the right version?

MR. BELL: Yes, your Honor, we are fine.

THE COURT: I will let counsel have a break. soon.

(Recess)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

So my law clerk is making those corrections to those We'll give copies of the final draft of the jury instructions to counsel. Counsel should look at those and make sure that confirms to what I read. Once we have that vetted by counsel, we will mark that as Court Exhibit 1 and have that sent into the jury. The verdict form will be Court Exhibit 2.

Any objection to that?

MR. BELL: None, your Honor.

MS. LYNAUGH: No.

MR. MAZUREK: No.

The other thing I should say to the jury, I'll bring all the jurors out and go ahead and let the alternate jurors go on about their life. I will remind the alternate jurors they still cannot read or listen to anything about this case or discuss this case with anyone at all, and I will let them know

THE COURT: Anything I should say to the jury?

we'll be in touch with them if we need them and make sure they

have removed all of their personal items from the jury room.

For the regular jurors, I plan to instruct them that they still cannot read anything about this case or listen to anything about this case or discuss this case with anyone except amongst themselves when they are all in the jury room. If a juror needs to step out to take a smoke break or anything else, they cease their deliberations and may not resume until all the jurors are there. Any objection to that?

MR. BELL: None your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let's bring them in. I think, counsel, I will ask my Wonderful and Talented Deputy to ask the alternate jurors to bring their belongings with them unless there is an objection to that?

MR. BELL: None.

THE COURT: Okay, let's do that.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

I will ask my Wonderful and Talented Deputy to please

swear the marshal in.

(The marshal was duly sworn)

THE CLERK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Now, first to the alternate jurors, I am going to instruct you as follows:

First of all, we are going to let you leave, but you are not excused from jury duty. You are still on jury duty, so my prior instructions to you remain in effect. Do not read anything about this case. If you see anything about this case in the newspapers or in the internet or anywhere else, stop reading. Don't listen to anything about this case. If you hear anything on the television, radio or internet, stop listening. Do not discuss this case with anyone and don't allow anyone to discuss this with you, meaning don't discuss it amongst yourselves, don't discuss it with deliberating jurors, don't discuss it with anyone and don't let anyone discuss this with you.

Also don't do any research regarding any of the people or the issues involved in this case. You are still on jury duty, but you may leave the courtroom and go on about your lives, with those instructions in mind. We might still need you. If so, we will be in touch with you. We will be in touch with you either way. If you are no longer needed, we will let you know that as well. Until you hear from us, those instructions remain in place.

Have you retrieved all of your personal items from the jury room? You may leave. We have your contact information and we will let you know if we need you, okay.

(The alternate jurors left the courtroom)

THE COURT: For the regular jurors, you are now going to start your deliberations. However, certain instructions are still in effect. Do not read anything about this case. If you see anything about this case, the newspaper, on the internet, stop reading. Do not listen to anything about this case. If you hear anything about this case on the television, the internet, the radio, stop listening.

Do not do any research regarding any of the people or the issues in this case. Now, the change is in terms of discussing this case, you still may not discuss this case with anyone else outside of the jury room. You may only discuss this case in the jury room with your fellow jurors when all of you are present.

So if a juror needs to step out of the jury room to take a smoke break or something, you must cease your deliberations and you may not resume them until all of you are present. So if at any time a juror needs to step out, you must cease your deliberations. Other than that, you still may not discuss this case with anyone else, not even amongst yourselves.

So Juror No. X can't have a conversation with Juror

No. Y outside of the jury room, and you can't even have that conversation within the jury room unless all of the jurors are present, all right?

And again don't read anything about this case. Don't research anything about the people or issues involved in this case. Don't let anyone else discuss this with you. Don't discuss this with anyone else, all right?

You may start your deliberations. We have ordered lunch for you. Your lunch should be there around 12:30 to 12:45, okay? Stay here for just a moment and let me see counsel in the robing room briefly.

(At the sidebar)

THE COURT: I wanted to check before we send them in to deliberate. Did I leave anything out?

MR. MAZUREK: Were you going to ask them whether they intend to inform us whether they intend to go until 2:30 or 5:00?

THE COURT: I hadn't planned on it. I can. We told them that before. Again I don't want to do anything that in any way may make them feel a certain kind of way. My sense is these jurors aren't particularly shy. If 2:30 comes around and they want to go, they'll let us know.

MR. BELL: Fine.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Fine.

MR. MAZUREK: That is fine.

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THE COURT: We'll leave it alone. If they don't have a verdict at 4:50 or so, my intention would be to bring them in at 4:55 and excuse them for the day. At that point it may make sense — we'll cross that bridge when we get to it — it may make sense to let them know we won't be sitting Friday. We'll wait until Thursday morning to tell them that.

If they end up not reaching a verdict today, at whatever time that is, my plan is that we dismiss the jury for the day, and I will tell the jury they don't have to come into court, they would just go in the jury room. Again I will remind them they can't start their deliberations until everyone is there.

MR. SHECHTMAN: Fine.

MR. MAZUREK: Fine.

MR. SHECHTMAN: It probably makes sense for us when they first go in, to make sure we have all the exhibits because we are likely to get a note that says send them all in. We have ours ready. You have yours?

MR. MAZUREK: Yes.

MR. SHECHTMAN: We'll check each other's.

THE COURT: While we are back here, we have the final versions of the jury instructions. Counsel, please look at those.

MR. SHECHTMAN: We are fine.

THE COURT: I want counsel to look at them before we

send them in so there is no issue before we send that in. We can go ahead. I guess I will tell the jury that we'll give them the instructions later, and maybe it doesn't make sense to tell them anything, let them start deliberating and get them the verdict sheet and jury instructions.

MR. SHECHTMAN: We can tell them they'll have them in 15 minutes.

MS. LYNAUGH: It is fine.

MR. BELL: We are comfortable now.

MR. SHECHTMAN: We are fine either way.

THE COURT: We'll just leave that.

(In open court)

THE COURT: You may begin your deliberations.

(The jury left the courtroom at exactly 10:56 am to begin deliberations)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

Again, counsel, go ahead and look through that final version of the jury instructions and make sure that comports with everything that was read, and I think you have checked the verdict sheet. Let me get one of the copies we gave counsel and let me make sure that is the right one. Let's have all counsel inspect that before that goes to the jury to make sure that is the right version, and we'll make that Court Exhibit 2.

MR. BELL: The verdict sheet looks good.

THE COURT: Show that same copy to counsel for the

defense so that we're all on the same page.

(Pause)

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MS. LYNAUGH: That is fine with us, your Honor.

THE COURT: We'll mark that as Court Exhibit 2.

Let me know when you have finished reviewing the jury instructions, and we'll mark that as Court Exhibit 1 and send that in as well.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Yes, counsel?

MR. SHECHTMAN: We are all okay, Judge.

THE COURT: Let's get one of these copies and make sure we have the right copy.

(Pause)

MR. SHECHTMAN: We are fine.

THE COURT: Now we're getting a little hyper-technical here, so what we have here, there is writing on the front and back of the documents to save a few trees. Do counsel care about that? Is that fine like that or do you want one side for the jury, or it doesn't matter?

MR. BELL: That is fine.

MS. LYNAUGH: It doesn't matter.

MR. MAZUREK: That is fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: We will make this Court Exhibit 1, and I will ask my Wonderful and Talented Deputy to give that to the marshal, and that will go to the jury. Counsel, you're free to

hang out and do whatever you want to.

At 12:45 the jurors' lunch should get here, so let's have counsel take their lunch break between 12:45 and 1:45.

There is no need to be in here for that. If the jurors have any notes or anything, they'll have to wait till we get back.

All right, thanks.

(Recess)

(Continued on next page)

1 (Jury not present, time noted: 11:22 a.m.)

THE COURT: Counsel, you should have a copy of the exhibits, Court Exhibits 3 and 4.

Counsel, do you have copies of the notes?

MS. LYNAUGH: Yes.

THE COURT: Court Exhibit 3 reads: Dear Judge, may we please be given twelve copies of the instructions you read to us this morning? Sincerely, signed by the foreman. Received at 10:56 a.m.

Court Exhibit 4: Judge, is there a way for us to receive twelve copies of the instructions? This will help the efficiency of our discussions. Thank you, signed by the foreperson, 11:03.

Let me hear from counsel. I get my guess my inclination is to give them copies of the instructions and we label them -- I guess the question I have is they have asked for twelve copies. It would ordinarily make sense to give them eleven copies, but they asked for twelve copies so my inclination is to give them twelve copies of the instructions and we label them 1A through L, Court Exhibits 1A through L, but I'll hear what counsels' thoughts are.

MR. NAWADAY: That makes sense to us.

MR. MAZUREK: That's fine.

MS. LYNAUGH: That's fine.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me check my alphabet, I think

that's right. A through L.

So we'll make copies of those notes. My inclination is for us, instead of bringing them out here, since they're trying to move efficiency, we'll write a note and show it to counsel that says something to the effect of: We received your notes. We're making twelve copies of the instructions and we will provide them to you.

Any objection to that by the government or the defense?

MR. NAWADAY: No, your Honor.

MS. LYNAUGH: None.

MR. MAZUREK: No.

THE COURT: Okay, we will do that.

Let me check with my clerk and my wonderful and talented deputy to see who has the best penmanship, because it's not me.

(Recess taken)

THE COURT: Counsel, so again, we did this before. There wasn't a court reporter here, so I want to put this on the record.

Again, we received Note Number 3 from the jury, Dear Judge, may we please be given twelve copies of the instructions you read to us this morning. Sincerely, signed by the foreman.

Note number 4, Judge, is there any way for us to received twelve copies of your instructions? This will help

the efficiency of our discussions.

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I explained to counsel before that my inclination was to give them twelve copies of the instructions, and counsel didn't have any objection to that. I want to put that on the record so we're clear.

Counsel for the government, is that correct?

MR. BELL: It is.

THE COURT: Counsel for the defense, is that correct?

MR. MAZUREK: Yes.

MS. LYNAUGH: Yes.

THE COURT: Counsel for defense waived their client's appearance, and we had that discussion before. Do counsel for the defense waive your client's appearance right now on the record.

MS. LYNAUGH: Yes.

MR. MAZUREK: We do.

THE COURT: And we also discussed what to say, and we discussed saying something to the effect we have received your note, we are making twelve copies of the instructions for you and we will provide them to you soon.

And counsel were in agreement with that, is that correct, counsel for the government and the defense?

MR. BELL: Yes, your Honor.

MS. LYNAUGH: Yes.

MR. MAZUREK: Yes.

THE COURT: And my wonderful and talented deputy typed up a note to that effect. Have counsel all seen that note we will send into the jury?

MR. BELL: We have, and it's fine.

MR. MAZUREK: Yes.

MS. LYNAUGH: Yes.

THE COURT: So we will mark that note as Court Exhibit 5. We will send that in to the jury. My law clerk is currently making copies of the instructions, and when they are here we will mark those as 1A through L and send him in to the jury.

Counsel, anything else?

MR. BELL: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

(Recess taken)

THE COURT: We have copies of the jury instructions.

We're stapling them. I want counsel to inspect those before we label them and send them into the jury. We have twelve copies of the jury instructions, so we'll have counsel review that before we send that in.

The other thing that I thought of, and I don't know if counsel want do anything about this, is typically if the jury requested to have a particular instruction reread to them or the like, I would give them some sort of general instruction that you should consider my instructions as a whole, and not

single out any instruction. I don't know, obviously, what the jury is doing in there, I don't know if counsel want me to write something to that effect in there. It's in the general instructions, it's in like the second paragraph of the instructions. I wanted to raise that with counsel and see if counsel want me to do that. I'm willing to do that and write another note and say that, but I wanted to know what counsel's view is, starting with the government.

MR. BELL: I think we're all in agreement there isn't really a need.

MS. LYNAUGH: Agreed.

MR. MAZUREK: That's fine.

MR. BELL: And these were fine with us.

MS. LYNAUGH: That's fine.

THE COURT: Counsel for Huberfeld?

MR. MAZUREK: Yes, I'm good.

THE COURT: We'll label those 1A through L and send them in to the jury.

And again for the record, both Mr. Seabrook and Mr. Huberfeld are here.

Go ahead.

(Recess taken)

THE COURT: Counsel, we have a note. Counsel should all have copies of the note. Are counsel and the parties all here?

MR. SCHECHTMAN: We are, your Honor.

THE COURT: The note reads as follows: Jury undecided, will return tomorrow, requesting email Platinum to COBA, phone calls, prosecution and defense closing statement, restaurant picture, Reynolds and Wien due diligence documents, COBA side letter. Sincerely, signed by the foreperson.

So it's my intention -- I read this as they want to go home now. It's my intention to bring them out, tell them that we received the note, excuse them for the day with the instructions that I have given them before about not reading to anything or listening to anything or doing any research or discussing this with anyone. And it seems to me for the phone calls, assuming they're talking about the audio recordings, that we ask the jurors to get here at 9:00, bring them out here when they're all assembled, and play phone calls for them. But I will hear from counsel. Seems to me they shouldn't be getting the closing statements.

MR. BELL: There's a handful of things. You're certainly right about not getting the closing statements, as those are not evidence. We do think that it makes sense, perhaps even before they leave today so that we can get them started out right tomorrow, that we actually ask them to go back and clarify a couple of things.

There are, as your Honor knows, several dozen emails in evidence. It's not clear what Platinum to COBA means,

whether that would be the full subset of emails that includes one party from Platinum, one party from COBA. If so, that's a lot of emails, and that much isn't clear.

Phone calls, in addition to referring to the recorded conversations, which of course would take a while to play all of them, although if they want them, that's fine, may also very well refer to the summaries or the phone records underlying them in terms of patterns of calls. So I think it makes sense to clarify that well.

The restaurant picture is a bit of a surprise, but we're delighted to provide whatever restaurant pictures exist in the record.

The COBA side letter is somewhat clearer, but as to the other categories, it might make sense for us to have them clarify, spend five minutes doing that so we can get them what they need at jump tomorrow morning at 9:00.

THE COURT: Defense counsel?

MR. SCHECHTMAN: I think we're in agreement. And I would suggest that when it comes to emails between -- and I assume that means between Platinum and COBA, one would simply say to them: Do you want all emails that involve someone from Platinum and someone from COBA, or do you want a subset?

When it comes -- obviously the summations, they're not entitled to. The rest, the pictures, there are two pictures, I think, but if we send them both -- three, if we send them both,

I don't think they will be disappointed. If you tell them there's three and we send them all, unless they want to narrow it, but there are three different pictures.

The Reynolds and Wien due diligence are two documents so that one is easy. The COBA side letter, there actually are two side letters. Again, the easiest thing is to send both unless they don't want both, but I agree with Mr. Bell clarification is necessary.

The only question I think is do we do it tonight, which would probably take five to ten minutes, or do we sort of let them go home and do it the morning. The advantage of doing it tonight is we could have everything for them first thing in the morning, particularly if the phone calls mean the wiretap calls. And there I think I would say, do you want -- it's three choices, do you want the phone charts, do you want the phone records that underlie it, do you want the wiretap calls, and in particular do you want all of them, and whatever they say we'll go with.

THE COURT: So what do you want me to ask them in terms of phone calls?

MR. SCHECHTMAN: I think I'd say that there's some ambiguity there, and are they —— do they want simply the phone summary charts, do they want the underlying phone records that those charts were based on, or do they want some or all of the wiretaps? And let them check the box, and then see where we're

1 | at.

THE COURT: The summary charts aren't really --

MR. BELL: They are in evidence, so I think it would make sense to make that available.

And we're content to actually have your Honor send all of this back by note so that they can get something to us and we'll know, and then I think send them home.

THE COURT: All right. Should we perhaps let them know also in that note that we're going to dismiss you soon, but before we dismiss you we would like to clarify, so they're not thinking that we ignored their first request and making them stay here?

MR. BELL: Yes, please.

THE COURT: So we will type up or write something quickly and send that to the jurors. I will meet with my clerk and write something and have my deputy type it up.

MR. SCHECHTMAN: Would it be helpful if we tried to write a note on consent?

THE COURT: That's even better. Why don't you do that.

(Pause)

THE COURT: And the other thing, I know every party
has at least two lawyers here today, I guess so maybe the
second lawyer for each party, I could address this to you, it
does seem while counsel are doing that, it may make sense since

we'll let the jury go soon, but I will hear what counsel's thoughts, to let the jury know that we want them to come back at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow. It may make sense today to let them know that court is going to be closed Friday, but I will hear from counsel. I don't want to do anything that is going to make them feel coerced to do anything, but I also don't want to kind of just ambush them if they decide at like 2:30 they want to go home tomorrow and say they have to come back here on Monday and they start freaking out.

Let me hear counsel's thoughts.

MR. BELL: I think telling them makes sense for the reasons that your Honor said, and as Friday looms, it may become a bigger distraction.

MR. MAZUREK: I agree that we should tell them today about Friday.

THE COURT: Counsel for Mr. Seabrook?

MS. LYNAUGH: Agreed.

THE COURT: So perhaps -- I guess what we'll do is we'll get this note together to send to them in terms of getting clarification for their request, then this other information, we'll bring them out right before we dismiss them and I will tell them about Friday.

MR. MAZUREK: Sounds good.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHECHTMAN: I think we're ready, Judge. I'll

hand this up to the Court.

THE COURT: This seems fine. I will read this into the record. This is the note prepared by counsel, agreed to everyone, says: The Court's intention is to honor your request to go home. Before we do, however, could you clarify your note so that we can have it ready in the morning?

- 1. Do you want all emails between anyone at Platinum and anyone at COBA or some subset of those emails? If so, what subset?
- 2. Do you want (a) the summary phone call charts, (b) the actual phone records on which those charts were based, or (c) some or all of the wiretap conversations? If (c), which conversations?
- 3. There are three restaurant pictures. I will send them all to you unless you direct otherwise.
- 4. There are two side letters. I will send both to you unless you direct otherwise.
- 5. The summations are not evidence and therefore are not available to you.

Again, my preference would be to have clarification tonight, but I will send you home and wait for the morning if you prefer that course.

And that's agreeable to everyone?

MR. BELL: Yes.

MR. MAZUREK: Yes.

THE COURT: I will ask my wonderful and talented deputy to mark this as Exhibit 7 and send it in to the jury.

MR. BELL: Like that?

THE COURT: Like that, or type it up. I think the handwriting is good. It's not Reena Raggi quality, but it's very good.

Before we send that in, could we make copies of that before we give it to the jury?

(Pause)

THE COURT: We'll send that in to the jury now.

(Pause)

THE COURT: We have a note. Counsel and the parties are all here.

I will read this note. Dear Judge, I will reply to your points below.

- 1. We request all emails to anyone at Platinum and anyone at COBA. We also request the letters from Reynolds and Wien from 2014 with due diligence about PPVA, specifically the letters with their enumerated concerns and the follow up where three guarter concerns are resolved.
- 2. We don't want summary phone charts and phone records, but we think having the binders from the government would be very helpful.
  - 3. We will take all the restaurant pictures you have.
  - 4. Yes, as requested above in number one.

That's again talking about the emails. I think they're responding point by point to our request.

- 5. Understood about the summary arguments, but can we have a list of what the FBI found in Seabrook's home?
- 6. Can we get the transcript, one copy sufficient, of Jona Rechnitz's full testimony, including direct, cross, and any redirect examination.

That's the request. We'll make a copy of this. I think the jurors want to get out of here, so it may make sense to make copies of that.

Let me find how counsel want to proceed. It may make sense to say thank you for responding to our request, bring them out, tell them to go home, and then I will instruct them to not read about the case or listen to anything about the case or discuss this case with anyone until or unless they are all assembled this the jury room together. I will ask them to get here at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow and tell them that we will assemble that material for them.

I also tell them that, as with today, if they haven't reached a verdict tomorrow, they may stop their deliberations at 2:30. If they want to go beyond that, we'll be available until 5:00. The same applies for any other day that they deliberate, but the Court will be closed on Friday.

Any objection to that by anyone?

MR. BELL: All of that sounds fine to us, your Honor.

HB8JSEA2

We would recommend one specific addition, I don't think we're alone on this, that being that, especially since this is the first day of deliberations, the jurors should leave their materials here, their notes, certainly the exhibits, all of that other stuff.

Charge

THE COURT: Yeah, I would tell them not to leave their personal belongings in the jury room, but they should leave, as they always left, their notebooks in the jury room as well as the verdict form and the jury instruction.

Anything else from counsel?

MR. SCHECHTMAN: No, your Honor.

MR. MAZUREK: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, let's bring the jury out.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: So we received your response to our request, thank you for that. We will assemble that information for you of and provide that to you tomorrow.

We're going to dismiss you for the day. Let me give you the instructions that I have given you before, a little bit extra. Do not read anything about this case. If you see anything in the papers or on the internet about this case, stop reading. Do not listen to anything about this case. If you hear anything about this case on the television or internet, radio, stop listening. Do not conduct any research regarding any people or issues in this case. Do not discuss this case

with anyone or allow anyone to discuss this with you until and unless you are all assembled in the jury room together. I will ask you to get here at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow.

In terms of scheduling, as with today, if you haven't reached a verdict, you may cease your deliberations at 2:30.

If you want to go beyond that, we are available to you until 5 o'clock. And that applies to any day that you may deliberate. In terms of scheduling, the Court will be closed on Friday, so we will not be sitting on this Friday.

At 9:00 a.m. you will not be coming out here, you will go to the jury room. And again, you may begin and resume — you should resume your deliberations when everyone is assembled, but you must not start your deliberations or resume your deliberations until all of you are assembled in the jury room. Don't leave any personal items in the jury room. You should leave your notebooks in there as well as the verdict form and the jury instructions. That will be locked up and safeguarded.

Hold on for a moment let me speak to counsel at sidebar briefly. Hold on just a second.

(In robing room)

THE COURT: I wanted to check, did I leave anything out? Any objection to anything? Anything else anyone wants?

MR. MAZUREK: No.

THE COURT: Okay, I'll let them go. Thanks.

	HB8JSEA2 Charge
1	(In open court)
2	THE COURT: Okay. We'll see you tomorrow. Have a
3	good evening.
4	(Jury not present)
5	THE COURT: Again, let's give the jurors a five-minute
6	head start.
7	Is there anything else that we need to discuss?
8	Counsel, we will make copies of this note and give it
9	to counsel. If counsel want to look at it now, you may. Maybe
10	you can discern something from the handwriting.
11	MR. BELL: Your Honor, we may be able to settle on
12	what it is we have to do night.
13	THE COURT: I'll be here. That's fine. I'll give
14	counsel a chance to do that.
15	(Adjourned to November 9, 2017 at 9:00 a.m.)
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